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Abstract
Wearable devices have proliferated in usage and human experience, and they provide convenience for personal
information requirements. These devices are both sensory and immersive for the diverse global network that is
generally termed the Internet of things (IoT). The immediacy of the two-way communication created in the IoT has
made vulnerable human behaviour and raised debate around information ownership and privacy expectations. The
legitimacy of ownership of information and its reuse are prevalent problems. In this research, we tested four
wearable devices that share 44% of the current market, for security vulnerabilities. We found serious weaknesses
that could result in the unplanned disclosure of information and recommend further research into users
expectations for safety.
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INTRODUCTION
Wearable devices have been around for decades in the form of small electronic devices that compensate for human
failure in for example, sight and hearing. Wearable hearing aids have been available in different forms for an
extended period; however, the technology today is very different in flexibility and functionality from what was
available 15 or 20 years ago. Today wearable devices are integrated into a body area network (BAN) for two-way
communication and placed into a context that is generally termed the “Internet of Things” (IoT) (PwC, 2016). The
purpose of these devices is not only to compensate for human physical and psychological failure, but more
commonly to extend the reach of the human through interconnectivity with information sources (NIST, 2010).
Consequently, today a human using a wireless Bluetooth earpiece may not be compensating for physical
challenges but rather extending their sensory capability by connecting with personal or remote information
sources. Developments that are more recent have included devices that monitor personal biological data,
geolocation, and emotions. Some of these are used for health purposes, information exchange, and others for
navigating around unfamiliar environments. The value of this technological opportunity is a global human
experience of interconnectivity that has collapsed the barriers between internal and external environments and
provided full personal immersion. In this fashion, a human may experience a fully augmented reality for the
betterment of themselves and the systems in which they participate. The simplest functional architecture provides
a connection between a wearable broadcast mechanism and a receiving station (Zhou, et al., 2014). Because most
people have a smart phone on them most of the time, then the smart phone has become the receiving station for a
multiplicity of different devices that the human may carry within their BAN. There are many examples of
connectivity that both transmits information and receives information in the two-way relationship between the
base station and the broadcast mechanism or sensors. The eyeglass that streams information to the user and directly
to the eye has significant publicity. In addition, wearable watches and biometric monitoring equipment such as the
Fitbit, provide personal information for decision-making (Burlacu, 2016; Stack, 2015).
The personal nature of the information managed by the BAN has raised the issue of information ownership
(Schelleus, et al., 2014). Personal expectations to control the information from a wearable device, such as a Fitbit,
may be a foregone conclusion of the user, and yet the patient owners of the device, the owners of the software,
and the owners of the cloud services, and others involved in the brokerage and intermediation of services may all
assert ownership of the data. The borderless interconnectivity of human and networks also presents interjurisdictional challenges regarding ownership of informational properties, and identification of who has the rights
of disclosure and transaction. The fundamental principles of security design require the confidentiality, integrity,
and accessibility to information. In situations where the user of a wearable device expects the exclusive ownership
of the information that they produce using the device (Zhou, et al., 2014), then the confidentiality and the integrity
of the information has to be preserved. Our research is concerned the vulnerability of wearable devices to attacks
that can disclose the information the device produces. This research is an attempt to satisfy customer expectations
for the confidentiality of their information, and the management of unwarranted disclosures. We tested four
wearable devices that had 44% of the market share at the end of 2016 (IDC, 2016), for the presence of security
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mechanisms that would preserve the confidentiality of information the device produced from the user actions.
Each of these devices was presented on a watch strap to be attached to the wrist of the human. Each device had
sensors that trapped a range of biometric data from the end user and also had interconnectivity to broadcast that
information for processing, archiving, and providing feedback to the user. The majority of the information
processing was done by cloud services in the form of historical logs that tracked and kept account of the user
biometric data. All of the devices relied upon Bluetooth low energy as the wireless communication protocol for
synchronisation back to the user smart phone (Great Scott, 2015). If the user did not wish to use their smart phone
in for example, a gymnasium or a motor vehicle, then they could tether the device to the exercise machine, the
motor vehicle network, or to any other local wireless network via the Bluetooth low energy connection for the
same effect. The Bluetooth wireless and the tethering protocol is vulnerable to attacks that could violate the
confidentiality of information, the integrity of information, and the accessibility to information when hijacked and
subjected to service disruption (Cyr, et al., 2014).

BACKGROUND LITERATURE AND METHOD
A consistent theme in literature is the security vulnerability during the pairing of the wearable device with the base
station. At the point of pairing the exchange of information is vulnerable. When pairing for the very first time
Bluetooth employs one of three Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) strategies:


Just works – pairs automatically as it requires with no user interaction. Convenient for IoT accessibility
but the least secure.



Numeric comparison - When pairing for the first time both the wearable and smartphone display an
identical four to six-digit numerical key. If they match, the smartphone prompts the user to accept the
connection.



Passkey entry - both devices have a user interface for entering a four to six-digit code. One, or both
devices must enter a passkey to successfully pair. The authors credit this approach as being the most
secure (Lotfy & Hale, 2016; Pieterse & Olivier, 2014)

A review of three wearables by Lotfy and Hale (2016) found that the security of pairing strategies had significant
gaps and potential vulnerabilities including:
 Man-in-the-middle attacks, eavesdropping, and packet injection. These kinds of attacks allow attackers
to actively spy on wearable devices (user-correlation) and misuse the data.
The Pairing processes are defined as:
o

Generic Access Profile (GAP) – the wearable defines a specific advertising protocol. This is
important in our research design as this happens subsequent to initial pairing during recurring
connection instances.

o

Generic Attribute Profile (GATT) – service framework on top of the underlying transport
protocol, called ATT (Attribute Protocol), which sets the mutually agreed data transfer standard.

o

Both GAP and GATT operate in the 2.4 GHz bandwidth, transmitting at a speed of 1Mbit/sec.

While Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) operates on the same frequencies as other Bluetooth technologies, it operates
differently on the link and physical layer. BLE uses 40 total channels; three are used for advertising by unconnected
wearables. The remaining 37 channels are used during GATT for data transmission after pairing. The sequential
pairing process is shown in Figure 1 (Lotfy and Hale, 2016, p.3).

Figure1: GAP BluetoothLE advertising process showing advertising data, scan request, scan response and gap
initiation packets
Personally identifiable information (PII) is information that is assignable to a particular human system factor and
in some jurisdictions has legal protection (Boyle & Panko, 2014). Broadcasting a fixed MAC address, tied to an
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individual’s identity would fail the PII test by creating a unique user signature. When wearables create such a risk
without user notification, then breaches the privacy has to be considered jurisdiction by jurisdiction. For example,
the European Parliament’s, Protection of Personal Data Directive, enacted on 5 May 2016 and requiring member
states to have introduced into their national law by 6 May 2018, extends the definition of personal data to include
that which can “be identified, directly or indirectly” (European Parliament, 2016, p. 3). A fixed MAC address,
which risks unseen surveillance, breaches this requirement. The literature analysis identified that there are many
attack classes (see Figure 2) in and around the use of Bluetooth connectivity. To focus our research and to make
it feasible in the laboratory we selected the two attack classes and the five specific attacks highlighted in blue
(Hassen, et al., 2017). In respect to Surveillance class, the risk created by a digital signature can be sub-categorised
as:
i.

Blue-Printing – MAC address spoofing for a man-in-the middle attack.

ii.

Blue-Stumbling - Forced re-pairing attack.

iii.

Blue-Tracking – a brute force attack designed to determine the data encryption key if one is used.

Figure 2 – Classification of Bluetooth Attacks (Hassan et al., 2017, p. 5)
In this research we tested four wearable devices that were selected from the top sales performers in the market and
together they held a 44% share of the market at the end of 2016 (Cry, et al., 2014; Guo, 2015). The analysis was
conducted in the research laboratory during the first two months of 2017. Figure 3 shows the release dates and
devices selected (software versions were those at the time and do not account for any more recent updates).

Figure 3. The wearable devices tested
The research was structured to address concerns around device information visibility, pairing visibility,
surveillance potential, and information disclosure. The major focus was on potential eavesdropping and
surveillance attacks. All of the wearable devices relied upon Bluetooth low energy (BLE) as the wireless
communication protocol for data synchronisation between the device and the user smart phone (or other paired
network) (Grassi, 2014). The only variation was the Samsung Gear3 that was using version BLE 4.2 rather than
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BLE 4.0. The testing with different smart phones was to confirm the consistence of the protocol on different
devices. BLE is feasible for use across the Apple iOS, Android, Apple Mac OS, Linux and Microsoft Windows
operating systems. In the testing we used a Samsung S6 edge, HTC 1M7, and an Apple iPhone 5S, but did not
detect any variations in the BLE protocol execution that related to research concerns. For sniffing tools we selected
Ubertooth, the HCI snoop log and the Adafruit sniffer (Lofty, et al., 2016).
The method used two Android phones, and the Adafruit for capture of the BLE packets, and TCP dump in to
pcapng and pcap files respectively. The files acquired were then uploaded into Wireshark, an open source packet
analyser with a graphical user interface and filtering capability. Using Wireshark the data was examined to
determine whether it was transmitted in plain text, or in an encrypted format. Other analysis proceeded to locate
any digital signatures, device identification, mappings for the wearer's movements and habits, internet access to
device logs and databases, and geolocation correlation data. All the wearables include a back-end cloud service in
which an individual’s data is stored to ensure portability across devices, and we looked for any credentials
providing access rights. The research design is shown in Figure 4, and the blue box indicates the target zone for
the sniffing of pairing activity.

Figure 4. Research Design

FINDINGS
The HCI snoop log is an application that sits on smart phones. It was used in each instance to successfully capture
the BLE log file which was then uploaded to Wireshark for analysis. Both encrypted and unencrypted information
was found. The unencrypted packets were advertising packets that included the connection request and response.
The remainder of the packets were encrypted suggesting that once the exchange protocols and keys have been
agreed, all messages were encrypted. We found that the majority of the wearable devices packets were encrypted
and the extent of the security mechanisms varied on a device-by-device basis, despite all of them relying upon the
BLE protocol. The Adafruit sniffer could successfully follow a device once the connection had been established.
The Ubertooth had a similar performance. Using the Adafruit for interception we found that when the wearable
device and the base station paired the identity was disclosed in plain text. It may be good for efficiency purposes
to have the brand and the watch identity publicly displayed in the wireless network, but for an attacker this is a
bonus and makes an easy target. Each wearable device had a different performance and a different susceptibility
to attack. Surprisingly the Amazon fit broadcasted the long-term encryption key in plain text during the initial
setup as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5. A Plain Text Encryption Key captured
Notably the other wearable devices had encrypted this information. However, the MAC address of the Charge and
Surge did not change once connected, an identical result to the Amazon fit. The literature we had read stated that
Fitbit had addressed the MAC vulnerability, but our findings suggested otherwise. A fixed MAC address for a
session creates the risk of an attack vector based on user correlation or blue tracking. However, the research did
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show that some of the previously reported vulnerabilities had been addressed by the end of 2016. For example, the
Gear S3 was found to have advanced security mechanisms that were in keeping with the newer BLE version 4.2,
and was the most secure. However, our research showed that the HCI snoop log functionality found in most
smartphones captured the identity of the message senders, as well as the message in plain text. With this function
enabled the smart phones owner’s conversations using email, SMS and messaging applications such as Facebook
are preserved until a log is deleted. In Figure 6 this vulnerability is illustrated from our experiments.

Figure 6. Snoop log plaintext disclosures
Overall, the lab testing of these devices shows that manufacturers have made big steps to improve the security
around wearable devices. The security improvements in BLE version 4.2 have shut down some of the previous
attack vectors and undoubtedly, further improvements are evolving during 2017. In the wearable devices tested,
the security vulnerabilities detected indicate the threat classes potentially faced by a user. It is also notable that the
different wearable devices have different vulnerabilities but the most predominant issue to date is the disclosure
of the MAC, which allows for user correlation and blue printing attacks. The Amazfit performed the poorest out
of the four tested. It failed in each of the four threat classes, whereas the Gear S3 with the updated BLE version
performed the best in our tests. The implication of these findings is for corporates, such as health insurers, who
provide benefits to the customer when they are using wearable devices that have health control feedback loops
(MLC, 2017). In the case of a wearable device that is vulnerable to manipulation, the sponsoring corporate may
not have confidence that the information they are receiving, and the information on which they will make decisions
regarding providing benefits to their customer, can be trusted. In the bigger picture, wearable devices may fail
compliance criteria such as the requirements of the European Personal Data Directive. In these situations, the
purchaser requires notification in the specifications of the device regarding the security precautions for information
protection. There also needs to be independent testing so that the shrink-wrap claims may have some external
validation. Figure 7. shows the results from the laboratory testing.

Figure 7. Summary of Vulnerability

CONCLUSION
Wearable devices are convenient technologies that extend human natural senses and capabilities. Our research
shows that further consideration of information protection is required to avoid disclosure failures. The
improvement of information security by adopting countermeasures for pairing vulnerabilities will allow the
producer of the information choices regarding the control of its ownership. Further research topics arising from
this research for future projects are:
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The HCI Snoop log paired with the base station – Is the number of log files, and degree of information captured
controlled by the base station, the device, or both?
The Decrypt packets of the Amazfit – Future research should confirm that having the long term key is sufficient
to decrypt the information exchanged with the smartphone. Also, consumer testing should be broadened to include
data synchronisation from the smartphone to the web application.
PII failings – Determine whether the security vulnerabilities breach consumer privacy laws in key markets.
A broader range of attacks – Extend the man-in-middle attacks to intercept and manipulate communications. This
has far-reaching implications, not just limited to wearables but also to other IoT setups.
Framework – A compliance framework which brings visibility to data protections in wearables, addresses
standards, and reduces industry wide variations.
Further research is required to establish baselines for wearable device user expectations. At present the technology
is made functional and accessible to users but we argue that development is required to meet the full scope of
socio-technical expectations. Current users want the advantages of the technology, they are using it in increasing
numbers, but they also want assurances unwanted surprises of a personal nature will not be forthcoming. Such
unwanted attention is unsolicited advertising, personal profiling, geolocation matching, and so on. Our research
shows that the confidentiality and potential integrity of data produced by wearable devices tested were easily
compromised. More than a regular patch-by-patch updating of software is required to assure users their
information safety has been adequately addressed.
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